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In	 Europe,	 gas	market	mergers	 take	 place	 to	 reduce	 restrictions	 between	 gas	wholesale	markets.	
After	 a	 merger,	 transport	 capacity	 of	 multiple	 gas	 transmission	 system	 operators	 (TSOs)	 may	 be	
offered	as	substitutes,	which	may	result	in	competition	among	TSOs.	Based	on	a	theoretical	analysis,	
we	determine	the	optimal	set	of	tariffs	for	TSOs	considering	different	regulatory	regimes.	Applying	a	



















From	 an	 economic	 perspective,	 natural	 monopolies	 have	 a	 need	 for	 regulation.	 In	 absence	 of	
effective	competition,	regulation	ensures	that	the	monopolist	does	not	exploit	its	market	power,	e.g.	
by	 charging	monopoly	 prices,	 and	may	 also	 be	more	 focused	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 its	 services.	 Such	
monopolists	are	often	infrastructure	operators.		
In	 gas	markets,	 transmission	and	distribution	networks	 are	 viewed	 to	be	natural	monopolies,	
and,	 hence,	 are	 regulated.	 Transmissions	 networks,	 operated	 by	 transmissions	 system	 operators	
(hereafter:	TSOs),	 connect	all	major	players	and	 infrastructures	of	 the	gas	market.	Therefore,	 they	
are	said	to	be	the	backbone	of	gas	markets	facilitating	wholesale	markets.	In	Europe,	there	are	gas	
market	areas	organised	as	so-called	entry-exit	systems,	which	also	allows	for	cross-border	trade.	In	
order	 to	 reduce	 obstacles	 to	 trade,	 and	 increase	wholesale	market	 liquidity	 and	 competition,	 gas	
markets	become	integrated,	in	particular,	by	market	mergers	(ACER	and	CEER,	2015).	










competition.	 However,	 such	 a	 competition	may	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 demand	
side,	i.e.	network	users’	behaviour,	is	efficient.	Keller	et	al.	(2019)	analysed	the	behaviour	of	network	
users	booking	gas	transport	capacities	offered	by	multiple	TSO,	which	are	substitutes.	Measuring	the	
efficiency	 of	 booking	 transport	 capacities	 at	 cross-border	 interconnection	 points	 offered	 as	
substitutes	 by	multiple	 TSOs,	 they	 find	 network	 users	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 difference	 in	 prices	 of	






mind	 an	 efficient	 booking	 behaviour	 of	 the	 participants	 on	 the	 demand	 side,	 and	 the	 regulatory	
regime	applied.		
In	the	 literature,	 there	are	a	number	of	regulatory	regimes	for	tariff	setting	applied	to	energy	
networks,	which	differ	 in	 incentive	 power	 and	 level	 of	 profits	 allowed	 (Arcos-Vargas	 et	 al.,	 2017).	
Armstrong	and	Sappington	 (2006)	 examined	how	 to	 introduce	 competition	 in	 regulated	 industries	
finding	that	an	optimal	liberalisation	process	highly	depends	on	the	institutional	setting.	In	the	case	
of	the	liberalisation	of	the	British	gas	market,	they	show	that	allowing	for	competition	in	regulated	
industries	 often	 refers	 to	 activities	 such	 as	 production	 and	 supply	 of	 utilities,	 and	 not	 directly	 to	
competition	between	 infrastructures.	Vogelsang	 (2002)	 assessed	 the	 competitive	 role	of	 price-cap	




requires	 a	 contestable	 market	 and	 free	 market	 entry	 (Baumol,	 1982).	 Laffont	 and	 Tirole	 (1996)	
examined	 potential	 competition	 between	 an	 integrated	 incumbent	 owning	 telecommunication	
networks	 and	 new	 entrants.	 Their	 work	 aims	 to	 find	 the	 optimal	 access	 charge	 to	 the	 essential	
facility	 so	 that	 the	 incumbent	 and	 the	 new	 entrant	 can	 compete	 in	 providing	 unregulated	
telecommunication	 services.	 They	 claim	 a	 duplication	 of	 a	 network,	 noting	 that	 this	 is	 associated	
with	high	costs,	may	be	justified	as	it	may	allow	for	competition.	Studies	and	research	intending	to	
contribute	explicitly	to	the	future	tariff	regulation	in	European	gas	markets	do	not	take	into	account	
the	 role	 of	market	mergers	with	 regard	 to	 the	potential	 for	 inter-TSO	 competition.	 Instead,	 these	
studies	 suggest	 applying	 zero	 tariffs	 at	 borders	 between	 gas	 markets,	 and	 recovering	 revenue	
shortfalls	 at	other	network	points,	or	 setting	up	a	 compensation	 scheme	 (Cervigni	et	al.,	 2019;	EY	
and	REKK	2018;	Hecking,	2015).		
Our	 paper	 extends	 the	 literature	 on	 (de-)regulation	 of	 natural	monopolists.	 It	 has	 a	 different	
view	 as	 compared	 to	 other	work,	 as	 the	 potential	 competition	 arises	 from	merging	markets	with	
regulated	 monopolists,	 and	 does	 not	 arise	 from	 unregulated	 new	 entrants	 in	 the	 market.	 In	
contributing	to	the	future	of	tariff	regulation	in	European	gas	markets,	our	focus	differs	from	other	
studies	 and	 research,	 which	 do	 not	 take	 account	 of	 market	 mergers	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	
potential	for	inter-TSO.	
This	 paper	 investigates	 tariff	 setting	 by	 TSOs	 under	 different	 regulatory	 regimes	 subject	 to	
market	mergers.	The	first	step	 in	the	 investigation	 is	the	theoretical	analysis	of	tariff	setting	under	
different	regulatory	regimes	taking	account	of	market	mergers.	Next,	it	explores	empirically	whether	
regulated	 TSOs	 in	 Germany	 consider	 the	 presence	 of	 other	 TSOs,	 being	 a	 substitute	 for	 network	
users,	in	setting	tariffs.		
For	 TSOs	 operating	 under	 a	 regulatory	 regime	with	 volume	 risks,	 we	 find	 that	 in	 theory	 the	
optimal	 set	 of	 tariffs	 depends	 on	marginal	 costs	 and	price	 elasticities.	 Since	 a	 TSO’s	 total	 allowed	
revenues	are	capped,	revenues	to	be	obtained	may	be	shifted	between	different	network	points	in	
order	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 not	 obtaining	 the	 allowed	 revenues	 granted.	 This	 is	 expected,	 in	




TSOs,	 which	 operate	 under	 a	 revenue-cap	 regime.	 Such	 regulatory	 regime	 is	 characterised	 by	






Following	 this	 introduction,	 the	 paper	 starts	 with	 describing	 how	 European	 gas	 markets	 are	
designed,	how	transmission	networks	are	commercially	operated,	how	market	mergers	 impact	gas	
markets	 and	 market	 players,	 and	 how	 tariff	 regulation	 can	 be	 designed	 (Section	 2).	 Section	 3	
continues	with	the	theoretical	framework	finding	the	optimal	set	of	tariffs	of	a	TSO	under	different	





A	 transmission	 system	 operator	 offers	 transmission	 services	 using	 a	 gas	 pipeline	 network.	
Transmission	 refers	 to	 the	 transport	 through	a	mainly	high-pressure	 infrastructure	not	 aimed	at	 a	
direct	 local	 distribution,	 and	 not	 including	 other	 activities	 than	 gas	 transport,	 e.g.	 production	 or	
storage.	 A	 TSO	 offers	 the	 use	 of	 a	 network	 by	 offering	 transport	 capacity	 to	 the	 market.	 Such	











allowing	 for	 cross-border	 trades	 and	 flows.	 If	 a	 country	 has	more	 than	 one	market	 area,	 IPs	 also	
exists	within	a	country.	All	other	network	points,	which	are	not	located	at	a	border,	are	referred	to	
as	 domestic	 points.	 These	 include,	 for	 instance,	 production	 sites,	 storage	 facilities,	 industrial	
customers,	and	networks	for	the	purpose	of	local	distribution.		
Based	on	 the	entry-exit	 system,	 gas	wholesale	market	 could	 evolve	 (Vazquez	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	





















3	 For	 simplicity,	we	assume	all	 IPs	are	bi-directional,	 i.e.	offering	capacity	between	MA	ABC	and	 the	 respective	adjacent	
market	area	in	both	flow	directions.	
5	




Whereby	 substitutes	may	arise	at	borders,	domestic	points	are	usually	 connected	 to	 just	one	
transmission	network.	While	TSOs	A	and	B	have	domestic	points,	TSO	C	does	not.	The	majority	of	
domestic	points	refer	to	end-customers.	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	industrial	customers	like	energy	
intensive	 industries	 and	 gas	 fired	 power	 plants,	 which	 are	 directly	 connected	 to	 a	 transmission	
network.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 households	 are	 connected	 to	 distribution	 networks,	 which	 are	
connected	 to	 transmissions	networks.	Hence,	households	are	 indirectly	 connected	 to	 transmission	











this	 theory	 also	 holds	 for	 gas	 transmission	 system	 operators,	 which	 operate	 an	 infrastructure	
characterised	 by	 a	 natural	 monopoly.	 Since	 TSOs	 are	 natural	 monopolists	 facing	 no	 effective	
competition,	 they	 are	 regulated.	 Regulation	 of	 European	 TSOs	mainly	 consists	 of	 network	 access	
regulation	and	tariff	regulation	supported	by	ownership	unbundling	provisions.		
6	
Tariff	 regulation	 determines	 how	 much	 a	 regulated	 TSO	 is	 entitled	 to	 earn.	 In	 principle,	
determining	 the	 allowed	 revenues	 includes	 consideration	 of	 realised	 investments,	 i.e.	 capital	
expenditures	 (CAPEX),	 into	 the	 infrastructure,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 costs	 to	 operate	 and	 maintain	 the	
infrastructure,	 i.e.	 operational	 expenditures	 (OPEX).	 As	 part	 of	 the	 capital	 expenditures,	 an	






Johnson,	1962).	Regardless	of	 the	regulatory	regime	applied,	 the	regulated	TSO	 is	given	a	revenue	
cap4	determining	how	much	the	firm	is	entitled	to	earn.	
After	 it	has	been	determined	how	much	a	TSO	 is	entitled	 to	earn	(𝑅!),	 the	 second	aspect	of	
tariff	 regulation	 refers	 to	 how	 the	 TSO	 obtains	 its	 allowed	 revenues	 by	 generating	 expected	
revenues	from	the	forecasted	(superscript	f)	sales	of	capacity	products	at	different	network	points,	
IPs	as	well	as	domestic	ones,	 (𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛),	at	a	tariff	applicable	to	network	point	 i.	 In	this	respect,	
the	revenue	cap	constraint	in	Equation	(1)	is	binding	to	the	TSOs.5	
𝑅! =  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠!!  ×𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!!!!! 	 (1)	
According	 to	 the	 revenue	 cap	 constraint,	 a	 TSO	 is	 granted	 a	 level	 of	 allowed	 revenues	 for	 a	
specific	 period,	 which	 must	 not	 be	 exceeded	 by	 the	 expected	 revenues	 obtained	 from	 expected	
capacity	sales	and	the	tariffs	applicable.6	Given	a	revenue	cap	constraint,	tariff	optimisation	of	a	TSO	




assume	 there	 are	 two	 network	 points	 with	 equal	 capacity	 bookings	 and	 tariffs.	 Total	 revenues	
obtained	 from	 these	 two	network	 points	 do	not	 change	 if	 one	 tariff	 is	 decreased	while	 the	other	












7	 This	needs	 to	be	distinguished	 from	a	 regulation	of	profits.	 The	profits	 a	TSO	can	obtain	are	 related	 to	 the	 regulatory	
regime	 applied.	 For	 example,	 under	 rate-of-return	 regulation,	 in	 principle	 a	 TSO	 cannot	 raise	 its	 profits	 by	 choosing	











the	 TSO,	 makes	 a	 capacity	 forecast,	 or	 at	 least	 prescribes	 a	 methodology	 how	 the	 TSO	 has	 to	
forecast	 capacity	 bookings.	 The	 TSO	 has	 the	 incentive	 to	 underestimate	 the	 capacity	 demand:	 If	
actual	 bookings	 exceed	 the	 forecasted	 bookings,	 the	 TSO	 obtains	 extra	 revenues	 and	 profits.	
Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 control	 and/or	 set	 clear	 rules	 as	 how	 to	
forecast	capacity	bookings.	 If	 the	expected	volumes	are	based	on,	 for	 instance,	historical	data,	the	
TSO	may	argue	 in	discussions	with	the	regulatory	authority	that	the	resulting	tariffs	have	an	effect	
on	 demand	 so	 that	 the	 forecast	 needs	 to	 consider	 this.	 This	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 information	




Secondly,	 a	 regulatory	 authority	may	 give	 freedom	 to	 the	 regulated	 TSO	 to	 forecast	 capacity	
bookings.	This	comes	with	the	advantage	that	no	interaction	between	the	regulatory	authority	and	
the	 regulated	 TSO	 regarding	 the	 capacity	 forecast	 is	 necessary.	 Hence,	 it	 also	 overcomes	 the	
problem	of	information	asymmetry.	In	this	situation,	ceteris	paribus,	lower	capacity	forecasts	can	be	
expected	 as	 this	 leads	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 TSOs	 revenues.	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	 characteristic	 for	 a	
revenue-cap	regime,	which	imposes	a	maximum	of	allowed	revenues	(Arcos-Vargas	et	al.,	2017).	To	
avoid	 lower	 capacity	 forecasts	 to	 increase	 revenues,	 a	 TSO	 under	 a	 revenue-cap	 regime	 is	 not	
entitled	to	keep	extra	revenues	obtained,	i.e.	the	revenues	exceeding	the	level	of	allowed	revenues,	






revenue-cap	 regime.	 A	 TSO	 operating	 under	 a	 price-cap	 regime	 takes	 a	 volume	 related	 risk.	 To	
compensate	for	the	risk,	the	over-recoveries	can	be	kept,	which	is	why	the	TSO	has	the	incentive	to	
make	 use	 of	 information	 asymmetries,	 and	 forecast	 too	 low	 capacity	 bookings	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	
extra	revenues.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	revenue-cap	regimes	under	which	a	TSO	is	not	exposed	
to	 any	 volume	 related	 risk.	 Hence,	 there	 are	 also	 no	 extra	 revenues,	 which	 can	 be	 kept.	 This	 is	



















3.1 Optimal	 set	 of	 tariffs	 of	 a	 single	 TSO	 with	 a	 revenue	 cap	 constraint	 and	 a	
volume	risk	
Assume	there	 is	a	market	area,	which	has	not	been	affected	by	any	market	mergers,	and	 in	which	
there	 is	 only	 one	 single	 firm	 operating	 one	 transmission	 system.	 Furthermore,	 assume	 this	 firm	
operates	under	a	price-cap	 regime,	 so	 that	 it	 is	exposed	 to	a	volume	risk.	The	TSO	offers	 capacity	𝑥! > 0	at	network	points	𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛,	and	sets	tariffs	𝑡! 	≥ 0.	Furthermore,	the	TSO	is	assumed	not	to	
be	allowed	to	restrain	the	amount	of	capacity	on	offer,	so	that	the	maximum	capacity	on	offer	at	a	
particular	network	point	is	𝑥!,	and	is	exogenously	given.	This	implies	that	the	offer	of	capacity	at	one	
point	does	not	affect	the	amount	offered	at	any	other	network	point	so	that	!!!!!! = 0,	 if	𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.	The	
TSO	 offers	 a	 capacity	 vector	 𝑥	 at	 a	 tariff	 vector 𝑡.	 The	 demand	 function	 is	 𝑞 = 𝐷(𝑡),	 its	 inverse	
demand	 is	 𝑡 = 𝐷!!(𝑞),	 with	 a	 slope	 𝛽! = !!!!!! < 0	 at	 each	 network	 point.	 The	 inverse	 demand	
function	 implies	 that	 in	 setting	 tariffs	 at	 a	 point	 i	 the	 TSO	 considers	 the	 tariffs	 set	 at	 all	 other	
network	points,	to	which	revenues	to	be	obtained	may	be	shifted.8		
Total	 revenues	 obtained	 of	 the	 TSO	 are	 𝑅 = 𝑞!𝑡!!!!! .	 Total	 costs	 are	 𝐶 = 𝐶 𝑞!,… , 𝑞! ,	
allowing	 marginal	 costs	 to	 differ	 for	 each	 network	 point.	 Price	 elasticity	 of	 demand	 at	 point	 𝑖 =1,… , 𝑛	is	defined	as	𝜀! = !!!!!! × !!!! < 0.	The	TSO	maximises	profits	𝜋 = 𝑅 − 𝐶	subject	to	the	revenue	
cap	constraint	and	the	capacity	constraints	at	each	network	point,	and	considers	 the	possibility	 to	
shift	revenues	between	network	points:	max!!,…,!! 𝑅 − 𝐶	𝑠. 𝑡.𝑅 ≤ 𝑅! ,  and 𝑞! ≤ 𝑥!  ,	for	all	i	=	1,...,n.	
The	Lagrangian	function	is:	𝐿 𝑞!,… , 𝑞!, 𝜆, 𝜇!,… , 𝜇! = 𝑅 − 𝐶 − 𝜆 𝑅 − 𝑅! − 𝜇! 𝑞! − 𝑥!!!!! .	







Rewriting	the	first-order	conditions	yield:	1 − 𝜆 !"!!! = !"!"! + 𝜇!⟹ !"!!! = !!!! !"!"! + 𝜇! ,	if	λ	≠	1.	
We	assume	that	second-order	conditions	are	negative,	so	the	Lagrangian	is	concave.9	
In	order	to	derive	optimal	tariffs,	solve	𝜕𝑅𝜕𝑞! = 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! 𝑡!!!!! + 𝑞! 𝜕𝑡!𝜕𝑞!
!
!!! 	= 𝑡! + 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! 𝑡!!!!!!!! + 𝑞!
𝜕𝑡!𝜕𝑞! + 𝑞!!!!!!!!
𝜕𝑡!𝜕𝑞! 	
= 𝑡! + 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! 𝑡!!!!!!!! +
𝑡!𝜀! + 𝑞!!!!!!!!
𝜕𝑡!𝜕𝑞! 𝑞!𝑞! 𝑡!𝑡! 	
= 𝑡! + 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! 𝑡!!!!!!!! +
𝑡!𝜀! + 𝑡!𝜀!,!!!!!!!!
𝑞!𝑞! 	
= 1 + 1𝜀! 𝑡! + 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! + 1𝜀!,! 𝑞!𝑞! 𝑡! ,!!!!!!! 	
where	𝜀! = !!!!!! × !!!! < 0	and	𝜀!,! = !!!!!! × !!!! ≠ 0.	The	latter	term	is	a	cross-elasticity,	which	is	positive	
in	case	of	substitutes.	 It	shows	the	change	in	demand	at	network	point	 i	 in	relation	to	a	change	in	
tariffs	at	another	network	point	j	of	the	same	TSO.	
Combining	with	!"!!! = !!!! !"!"! + 𝜇! ,	assuming	λ	≠	1,	gives:	
1 + 1𝜀! 𝑡! + 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! + 1𝜀!,! 𝑞!𝑞! 𝑡!!!!!!!! =
11 − 𝜆 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑞! + 𝜇! .	
Assuming	a	 relative	elastic	demand	𝜀! < −1	 and	0 ≤ 𝜆 < 1	 to	ensure	a	positive	 relation	between	
tariffs	and	marginal	costs,	the	optimal	tariff	applicable	at	network	point	i	is	given	by	Equation	(2).		
𝑡!!"#$%&' = 𝜀!𝜀! + 1 11 − 𝜆 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑞! + 𝜇! − 𝜕𝑞!𝜕𝑞! + 1𝜀!,! 𝑞!𝑞! 𝑡!!!!!!!! 	 (2)	
According	to	Equation	(2),	an	optimal	tariff,	which	is	applicable	at	a	network	point	i,	and	which	
is	part	of	 the	optimal	 set	of	 tariffs	of	 a	TSO,	 is	determined	by	 three	 components;	 the	elasticity	of	
																																								 																				
9	 If	 the	 cost	 function	 is	 linear,	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 the	 Lagrangian	 to	be	 concave	 !!!!"!! < !!!! !!!!"!! < 0 , is	 a	 concave	
revenue	function,	that	is	!"!!! > 0	and	!!!!"!! < 0. 	
10	
demand	𝜀!,	marginal	cost	 !"!"! + 𝜇! ,	and	the	interaction	between	network	points	of	the	same	TSO,	!!!!!! + !!!,! !!!! 𝑡!!!!!!!! .	The	third	component	of	an	optimal	tariff	consists	of	two	terms.	The	first	one	
refers	to	the	revenue	shifting	effect	
!!!!!! < 0 .	The	second	term	consists	of	two	factors.	 In	case	of	
substitutes,	the	elasticity	of	two	goods	is	always	positive.	This	is	the	case	here,	as	points	i	and	j	are	




is	 lower	 the	more	 revenues	 the	 TSO	obtains	 from	all	 points	 j;	 i.e.	 the	 higher	 the	 revenue	 shifting	
effect.		
Without	the	possibility	of	revenue	shifting,	 !!!!!! !!!! !"!"! + 𝜇! 	represents	the	optimal	tariff	of	a	
network	point	with	𝜀! < −1	and	0 ≤ 𝜆 < 1.	Such	tariffs	are	known	as	Ramsey	prices	(Ramsey,	1927).	
With	 𝜀! < −1	 and	 0 ≤ 𝜆 < 1,	 higher	 marginal	 costs	 are	 related	 to	 higher	 tariffs.	 The	 higher	 the	
elasticity	of	demand,	the	lower	the	mark-up	on	the	marginal	costs.		
It	 follows	 from	 Equation	 (2)	 that	 optimal	 tariff	 have	 a	 lower	 boundary,	 which	 is	 equal	 to	
marginal	 costs	 !"!"! > 0 .	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 firm	 enjoying	 a	 monopoly	 would	 not	 set	 a	 tariff	




Rewriting	 the	 first-order	 conditions	 yields	 !"!!! = − !!! ≤ 0.	 This	 result	 is	 not	 consistent	 with	
positive	marginal	 returns.	Hence,	 it	 holds	 that	 the	optimal	 tariff	 to	be	 set	by	a	TSO	 for	a	network	
point	 i	 lies	 within	 a	 range	with	 the	 lower	 boundary	 being	 equal	 to	marginal	 costs	 (MC),	 and	 the	
upper	boundary	being	the	monopoly	tariff:	𝑀𝐶 ≤ 𝑡!!"#$%&' < 𝑡!!"#"$"%&.	
3.2 Optimal	set	of	tariffs	of	a	single	TSO	with	a	revenue	cap	constraint	and	without	
a	volume	risk		
As	 compared	 to	 Section	 3.1,	 assume	 the	 TSO	 operates	 not	 under	 a	 price-cap	 regime	 but	 under	 a	
revenue-cap	regime.	As	highlighted	 in	Section	2.2,	 the	difference	between	the	two	regimes	 is	 that	
the	former	is	associated	with	a	volume	risk,	i.e.	the	risk	of	under-recoveries,	and	the	chance	for	over-
recoveries,	 which	 directly	 impacts	 a	 firm’s	 revenues.	 Under	 a	 revenue-cap	 regime,	 there	 is	 no	
volume	 risk	 for	 the	 regulated	 firm,	 as	 over-	 and	 under-recoveries	 are	 tracked	 on	 a	 regulatory	






𝑅𝐴! = 𝑅𝐴!!! + 𝑄!,!! − 𝑄!,!! ×𝑇!,! !!!! ×(1 + 𝑖),		 	 	 	 																	 (3)	
RA	 is	 the	 regulatory	 account	 balance,	𝑄!	 and	𝑄! 	 represent	 forecasted	 and	 realised	 capacity	
bookings,	T	is	the	tariff,	and	i	is	the	interest	rate.	Since	the	regulatory	account	tracks	differences	over	
time,	 its	 basis	 is	 the	 last	 account’s	 balance.	 In	 case	 the	 reconciliation	period	 is	 equal	 to	one	 tariff	
period,	 this	 value	 is	 zero.	 The	 second	 term	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 forecasted	 and	 realised	 capacity	
bookings	multiplied	 by	 the	 respective	 tariff	 applicable,	 for	 all	 network	 points	 of	 a	 TSO.	 This	 term	
refers	to	the	over-	or	under-recovery	
Assume	a	TSO	under	a	revenue-cap	regime	has	a	regulatory	account,	which	is	fully	reconciled	in	
the	next	 tariff	period,	and	 there	are	no	other	changes	 to	 the	allowed	 revenues,	 then	Equation	 (3)	
reduces	 to	𝑅!! = 𝑅!!!! + 𝑅𝐴!!!.	 Thus,	 regardless	 of	 tariffs	 applied,	 and	 irrespective	 of	 the	 actual	
capacity	 bookings,	 the	 TSO	 does	 not	 take	 any	 revenue	 risk.11	 Nevertheless,	 the	 revenue	 cap	
constraint	 is	 binding.	 If	 the	 TSO	 forecasts	 too	 low	 capacity	 bookings	 on	 purpose,	 tariffs	 will	 be	
higher.	If	these	higher	tariffs	are	applied	and	the	actual	bookings	exceed	the	forecasted	ones,	than,	
like	under	a	price-cap	regime,	 the	TSO	obtains	 revenues	exceeding	 the	allowed	revenues;	 the	TSO	
ends	up	with	an	over-recovery.	However,	 it	 is	 the	nature	of	a	 regulatory	account	 to	balance	over-	
and	 under-recoveries.	 In	 case	 of	 over-recoveries,	 the	 regulatory	 account	 redistributes	 the	 over-







rationale.	 EU	 tariff	 regulation,	which	 is	 the	 result	of	 a	process	with	high	 stakeholder	 involvement,	
states	 that	 the	 methodology	 to	 derive	 tariffs	 shall	 be	 transparent,	 i.e.	 comprehensible,	 cost-
reflective,	non-discriminatory	 for	different	 groups	of	 customers,	 i.e.	preventing	 cross-subsidisation	
and	 volume	 related	 risks,	 and	 shall	 not	 distort	 cross-border	 trade	 of	 gas	 (European	 Commission,	
2017b).	The	most	comprehensible	methodology	used	to	set	tariffs	is	referred	to	as	a	postage	stamp	
methodology	 (ACER,	 2013).	 Applying	 such,	 tariffs	 are	 determined	 by	𝑇! = 𝑇 = !!!!!!!!! .	 As	 a	 result,	
there	 is	 a	 uniform	 tariff	 applicable	 to	 every	 unit	 of	 capacity,	 regardless	 of	 the	 network	 point	 this	












not	 sufficient	 to	 cover	 operational	 expenditures.	 However,	we	 consider	 this	 to	 be	 an	 extreme	 scenario	without	 further	
relevance	for	this	paper,	and,	therefore,	neglect	it.	
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3.3 Optimal	 set	of	 tariffs	of	 competing	TSOs	with	a	 revenue	cap	constraint	and	a	
volume	risk	
Finding	the	optimal	set	of	tariffs,	the	market	structure	has	to	be	considered.	In	case	there	is	only	one	
single	 TSO	 offering	 capacity	 to	 and	 from	 adjacent	 gas	 market	 areas,	 this	 TSO	 enjoys	 a	 regulated	
monopoly	not	exposed	to	any	competition.	In	such	a	situation,	the	TSO	supplies	the	entire	demand	









We	have	determined	how	a	TSO	finds	 the	optimal	set	of	 tariffs,	but	 it	needs	 to	be	taken	 into	
account	that	this	approach	applies	to	all	TSOs	at	the	same	time.	Due	to	this,	tariff	setting	needs	to	be	
regarded	 under	 game	 theory.	 The	 action	 parameter	 is	 the	 tariff,	 while	 the	 capacity	 amounts	 are	
fixed.	Since	TSOs	operate	as	natural	monopolies,	we	also	assume	no	entry	of	new	competitors	in	the	





border	 operating	 one	 IP	 each,	 and	 hence,	 offering	 capacity	 as	 substitutes.	 As	 the	 TSOs	 at	 first	
optimise	their	tariffs	neglecting	competitive	pressure	induced	by	the	presence	of	other	TSOs	at	the	
same	border,	the	tariffs	T1,	T2	≥	0	are	part	of	the	optimal	set	of	tariffs	of	the	two	firms.	Such	tariffs	
may	be	adjusted	 in	 response	 to	 the	 competitive	pressure.	 Let	𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! = 𝑄! + 𝑄!	mark	 the	 total	
demand	for	capacity	at	that	border,	i.e.	total	demand	at	both	IPs,	as	a	function	of	the	tariffs,	and	let	𝑋!	 and	𝑋!	 denote	 the	 capacities	 offered	 by	 the	 two	 TSOs	 at	 their	 IPs,	 which	 are	 limited.	 Such	 a	
constraint	 takes	 into	account	 that	 the	amount	of	 capacity	offered	by	a	TSO	 is	 limited	 in	 the	 short	
run,	and	network	expansions	have	an	 impact	only	 in	the	 longer	run.	Within	this	setting,	four	cases	
can	be	distinguished,	which	differ	in	terms	of	the	capacity	constraint:	
1. capacity	constraint	is	not	binding:	𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! ≤ min 𝑋!,𝑋! 	
2. capacity	constraint	is	jointly	binding:		𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! > 𝑋! + 𝑋! 
3. capacity	constraint	is	individually	binding	for	all	players:	𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! ≤ 𝑋! + 𝑋!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! > 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑋!,𝑋!) 







which	 is	 known	as	Bertrand	competition	 (Bertrand,	1883).	 In	 the	 simple	 case	of	a	duopoly	and	no	
capacity	 constraints,	 two	 TSOs	 are	 in	 price	 competition,	 whereas	 the	 one	 with	 the	 lowest	 tariff	
serves	the	entire	demand;	it	is	an	all-or-nothing	game.	Hence,	demand	is	given	by	
𝐷 𝑇!,𝑇! =  
𝐷 𝑇! 𝑖𝑓 𝑇! < 𝑇!
𝐷 𝑇!2 = 𝐷 𝑇!2𝐷 𝑇!
𝑖𝑓 𝑇! = 𝑇!𝑖𝑓 𝑇! > 𝑇!     	 	
In	absence	of	a	capacity	constraint,	both	TSOs	are	able	to	supply	the	entire	demand	with	their	
available	capacity	being	a	homogenous,	 interchangeable	good.	 If	𝑇! < 𝑇!,	all	network	users	would	
book	their	capacity	at	TSO	2	as	demand	elasticity	is	supposed	to	be	perfectly	elastic.	Since	there	is	no	
capacity	demand	at	TSO	1,	TSO	1	is	supposed	to	lower	the	tariff	from	𝑇!	to	𝑇!!,	which	is	slightly	lower	
than	 𝑇!.	 In	 the	 following,	 TSO	 2	 should	 respond	 by	 lowering	 the	 tariffs,	 causing	 another	 tariff	





𝐷 𝑡!, 𝑡! =  
𝐷 𝑇! 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶! < 𝑀𝐶!
𝐷 𝑇!2 = 𝐷 𝑇!2𝐷 𝑇!
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶!𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶! > 𝑀𝐶!     	 	
Case	2:	Capacity	constraint	is	jointly	binding	
In	 the	 second	case,	 the	capacity	 constraint	 is	 jointly	binding.	None	of	 the	TSO	 is	able	 to	 serve	 the	





is	 different.	 In	 Case	 1,	 TSOs	 constantly	 reduced	 tariffs.	 However,	 in	 Case	 2,	 the	 TSOs	 have	 an	
incentive	 to	 raise	 tariffs	 such	 that	 the	 competitor	 is	 booked	 first.	 Once	 the	 competitor	 is	 fully	




the	entire	demand	but	both	TSOs	can	 jointly.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	question	 is	who	gets	which	market	
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share?	This	refers	to	a	so-called	Edgeworth	price	cycle.	According	to	Edgeworth	(1925),	an	oligopoly	
with	 capacity	 constraints	 to	 each	 of	 the	 firms	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 stable	 equilibrium.	 The	 firms	
underbid	 the	 competitors’	price	 to	 induce	a	 shift	of	 customers,	with	 the	aim	of	 increasing	market	
share.	However,	this	is	only	rational	to	a	certain	price	level,	at	which	attracting	a	higher	market	share	
is	 associated	with	 negative	marginal	 revenues.	 At	 this	 turning	 point,	 it	 is	 rational	 to	 increase	 the	










it.	 TSO	 2	 may	 try	 to	 underbid	 TSO	 1	 but	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 an	 underbidding	 process	 similar	 to	 a	
Bertrand	competition.	If	TSO	2	underbids	TSO	1,	TSO	1	will	not	attract	any	demand,	as	TSO	2	offers	
enough	capacity	 to	supply	 the	entire	demand	at	a	 lower	 tariff.	On	the	other	hand,	 if	TSO	2	grants	
TSO	1	a	certain	demand,	the	residual	demand	is	served	by	TSO	2.	The	quantity	may	be	lower	but	this	
allows	 for	 charging	 a	 higher	 tariff.	 Still,	 such	 equilibrium	 may	 only	 exist,	 if	 the	 residual	 demand	
served	 by	 TSO	 2	 exceeds	 a	 certain	 level.	 If	 the	 residual	 demand	 is	 too	 small,	 the	 TSO’s	 benefit	
charging	a	very	high	 tariff	 is	very	 low	compared	 to	 the	 loss	 in	quantity.	 In	 such	a	case,	a	Bertrand	
competition	may	be	expected,	although	the	capacity	constraint	is	binding	for	only	one	player	of	the	
game.	
All	 these	 cases	 refer	 to	 an	 iterative	 process	 of	 adjusting	 tariffs	 in	 response	 to	 a	 competitor’s	
tariff	setting.	 In	practice,	however,	tariff	setting	takes	place	prior	to	a	tariff	period	using	a	forecast	
for	 demand,	 and	 tariffs	 may	 not	 be	 adjusted	 during	 the	 tariff	 period.	 As	 potential	 capacity	
constraints	are	relevant	for	the	tariff	setting	game,	a	TSO	also	has	to	forecast	the	total	demand	at	a	
particular	 border.	 Although	 regulation	 imposes	wide-ranging	 transparency	 obligations	 on	 TSOs,	 in	
practice,	 this	 refers	mainly	 to	 historic	 data.	 Thus,	 the	methodology	 to	 set	 tariffs	 and	 information	
about	the	relevant	input	parameters	for	this	methodology	are	not	available	to	potential	competitors	
at	the	point	in	time	the	tariffs	are	set.	Although	actual	data	covering	the	past	can	be	considered,	the	






the	adjustment	of	 tariffs	 after	 some	bookings	have	been	made.	On	 the	contrary,	 a	TSO,	based	on	
publicly	available	data	and	an	 individual	 learning	curve,	 is	supposed	to	anticipate	the	behaviour	of	
other	TSOs.	
In	 anticipating	 the	 other	 TSOs’	 tariff	 setting	 behaviour,	 capacity	 constraints	may	 be	 relevant.	
Such	 exist	 in	 Case	 2,	 Case	 3,	 and	 Case	 4.	 However,	 as	 highlighted,	 these	 are	 one-shot-games	
associated	 with	 a	 risk	 of	 choosing	 a	 tariff	 which	 is,	 compared	 to	 the	 competitor	 and	 taking	 into	
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borders,	because	 the	market	merger	has	 created	 substitutes	 for	 the	network	users	at	 this	border.	
Equation	 (2)	 applicable	 to	 the	 pure	 monopoly	 case	 already	 includes	 an	 effect	 of	 substitution.	
Whereas	in	Equation	(2)	the	effect	is	related	to	revenues	being	obtained	at	other	network	points	of	
the	same	TSO,	competition	offers	 substitutes	 for	networks	users,	and	 is	 related	 to	 revenues	being	
obtained	at	the	same	border	but	by	competing	IPs	of	other	TSOs.	Hence,	in	setting	an	IP	tariff,	the	










information	 concerning	 tariff	 calculation	 is	 available,	 the	 higher	 the	 freedom	 of	 TSOs	 in	 setting	
tariffs,	 and	 the	 less	 possibility	 the	 firms	 have	 to	 respond	 to	 tariffs	 set	 by	 other	 TSOs.	 Therefore,	




Based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 analysis,	 we	 hypothesise	 that	 for	 TSOs	 with	 a	 binding	 revenue	 cap	
constraint,	and	which	are	exposed	to	a	volume	risk,	their	IP	tariffs	are	lower	in	case	substitutes	for	
their	products	exist	at	the	respective	border.	Ceteris	paribus,	we	expect	an	IP’s	tariff	to	be	lower	if	
the	 corresponding	 TSO	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 shift	 revenues	 towards	 domestic	 points	 with	 captive	
demand.	Moreover,	capacity	constraints,	i.e.	congestions,	should	also	impact	IP	tariffs.	




optimise	 tariffs.	 Hence,	 the	 TSO	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 indifferent	 regarding	 tariffs.	 This	 still	 holds	 if	
market	 mergers	 create	 competitive	 pressure	 through	 substitute	 TSOs.	 The	 different	 cases	 of	
competition,	in	general,	also	apply	to	TSOs	operating	under	a	revenue-cap	regime.	However,	as	the	
TSOs	 are	 ensured	 obtaining	 the	 revenues	 thanks	 to	 a	 regulatory	 account,	 competitive	 pressure	 is	
supposed	to	be	 ineffective.	Even	the	TSO	that	expects	 to	 lose	 the	competition	 for	demand	has	no	
need	to	adjust	tariffs.	The	TSOs	can	behave	 like	there	was	no	competitive	pressure	at	all,	knowing	
the	 firm	 is	 ultimately	 ensured	 obtaining	 the	 revenues	 granted	 by	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 via	 the	
regulatory	account.		
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The	 hypotheses	 about	 optimal	 tariff	 setting	 derived	 from	 the	 theoretical	 analysis	 are	 tested	 by	 a	
panel	data	analysis.	Tariffs	are	set	periodically	by	TSOs.	Therefore,	panels	may	be	created	using	TSOs	
representing	 the	 individual	 dimension	𝑘 = 1,…𝑚,	who	 set	 tariffs	 applicable	 at	 an	 IP	 located	 at	 a	
particular	border	𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛,	and	being	valid	for	a	tariff	period	t.	For	each	t,	this	results	 in	a	𝑚×𝑛	
matrix.	 As	 Figure	 1	 highlights,	 not	 every	 TSO	 has	 an	 IP	 at	 every	 border.	 Therefore,	 data	 is	 not	





If	 more	 than	 one	 TSO	 is	 offering	 capacity	 at	 a	 particular	 border,	 there	 are	 multiple	 tariffs	
applicable	 at	 that	 border	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Therefore,	 tariffs	 observed	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 the	





users’	 point	 of	 view,	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 for	 substitution	 between	 IPs,	 and	 between	 TSOs	
respectively,	 this	 is	 expected	 to	 influence	 IP	 tariff	 levels.	The	model,	 therefore,	 includes	a	dummy	
variable	 𝑑𝑆	 denoting	 whether	 substitutes	 are	 available	 to	 networks	 users	 with	 𝑑𝑆!,! = 1,	 if	 the	
number	of	TSOs	offering	capacity	at	a	border	i	in	t	exceeds	1,	and	0	otherwise.	
According	 to	 the	 hypotheses,	 TSOs	 may	 shift	 revenues	 to	 be	 obtained	 towards	 points	 with	
captive	demand,	as	the	elasticity	is	expected	to	be	lower	at	these	points	compared	to	IPs.	Hence,	it	
allows	for	avoiding	competition.	This	 is	 taken	account	of	by	the	dummy	variable	𝑑𝐶𝐷!,! = 1,	 if	 the	








at	a	border.	To	reflect	this,	the	model	takes	into	account	the	average	of	allowed	revenues	of	all	TSOs	𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑚	 at	 border	 i	 in	 t,	 i.e.	 !"!,!,!!!!!!!,! .	 As	 for	 the	 same	 reason,	 we	 include	 the	 average	 of	









period,	 and	whether	network	users	have	 a	possibility	 of	 substitution.	 The	 same	holds	 irrespective	
whether	 TSOs	 have	 captive	 demand	 or	 not,	 which	 is	 publicly	 available	 information.	 Hence,	 no	
forecasts	are	necessary	concerning	 these	 two	variables.	 In	 terms	of	 congestion,	 this	 is	different.	A	
TSO	 cannot	 know	 for	 sure	 prior	 to	 the	 tariff	 period	 whether	 or	 not	 an	 IP	 will	 be	 congested.	
Therefore,	the	TSO	has	to	predict	this.	The	same	holds	for	the	capacity	bookings.	A	TSO	may	already	
have	 contracts	 concluded	 before	 the	 tariff	 period,	 however,	 additional	 capacity	 bookings	may	 be	
obtained	during	the	tariff	period.	Forecasted	capacity	bookings	at	other	TSOs	are	also	unknown,	and	
have	to	be	predicted.	Thus,	the	average	capacity	booking	level	per	TSO	is	also	a	forecasted	value.	In	





variable	 is	a	 forecasted	one,	 this	 is	highlighted	by	a	 superscript	 f.	As	 the	models	are	estimated	by	
fixed	effects,	a	variable	covering	period	fixed	effects	(𝛽!),	such	as	general	changes	in	costs	of	capital	
or	 in	 inflation,	 and	 one	 covering	 cross-section	 fixed	 effects	 (𝛽!)	 representing	 unobserved	
heterogeneity,	are	included.	The	models	are	then	given	by	𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!,!! ) = 𝛽!! + 𝛽!! + 𝛽!! 𝑑𝑆!,! + 𝛽!! 𝑑𝐶𝐷!,! + 𝛽!! 𝑑𝐶𝑜!,!! 	+𝛽!! 𝑙𝑛 !"!,!,!!!!!!!!,! +  𝛽!! 𝑙𝑛 !"!,!,!!!!!!!!,! + 𝑢!,!! 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	
whereby	the	selected	sample	s	=	minimum,	maximum	and	median	tariffs.	
The	expectation	 for	 the	coefficients	estimated,	based	on	 the	 theoretical	analysis,	depends	on	
the	 regime	of	 the	data,	 to	which	 the	model	 is	applied.	For	a	 regime,	under	which	 the	TSOs	 face	a	
volume	 risk,	 such	 as	 price-cap	 regime,	 we	 expect	𝛽! < 0	 and	𝛽! < 0.	 In	 case	 an	 alternative	 TSO	
exists,	 tariffs	 are,	 ceteris	paribus,	 expected	 to	be	 lower	 (negative	𝛽!)	 as	 compared	 to	 situation,	 in	
which	a	TSO	 is	 the	only	 supplier	of	 capacity	 at	 a	border.	 In	 case	TSOs	have	 the	possibility	 to	 shift	
revenues	 towards	 captive	 demand,	 we	 expect	 them	 to	 make	 use	 of	 this	 possibility	 to	 avoid	
competitive	pressure,	which,	ceteris	paribus,	results	in	lower	IP	tariffs	(negative	𝛽!).	If	TSOs	operate	
under	 a	 regulatory	 regime	 without	 any	 volume	 risk,	 such	 as	 a	 revenue-cap	 regime,	 there	 is	 no	
incentive	 to	 take	account	of	other	TSOs’	 tariffs	when	setting	 the	own	tariffs.	Hence,	we	expect	𝛽!	
and	𝛽!	to	be	insignificant.	
As	for	congestion,	we	have	no	prior	expectations	for	𝛽!.	If	𝛽! is	positive,	the	TSO	anticipates	the	
congestion,	and	applies	higher	 tariffs	 to	 reflect	 the	predicted	scarcity.	 If	𝛽! = 0,	 the	TSO	does	not	
anticipate	congestion,	even	if	the	TSO	expects	congestion	to	arise.	This	behaviour	can	be	based	on	





Derived	 from	the	 revenue	cap	constraint,	 tariffs	are,	ceteris	paribus,	 supposed	 to	be	higher	 if	
the	allowed	revenues	 increase.	 If	capacity	bookings	 increase,	tariff	should	decrease.	Therefore,	we	
expect	𝛽! > 0	 and	𝛽! < 0,	 independent	 of	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 applied.	 However,	 if	 we	 obtain	
insignificant	𝛽!	 and	𝛽!,	 this	may	 point	 at	 TSOs	making	 use	 of	 revenue	 shifting	 towards	 domestic	
points.	If	at	all,	these	may	be	insignificant	in	case	TSOs	operate	under	a	regulatory	regime	implying	a	
volume	risk,	such	as	a	price-cap	regime.		
All	 our	 expectations	 apply	 to	 the	 minimum,	 the	 maximum,	 and	 the	 median	 tariff	 of	 border	
between	market	areas.	
4.2 Data	








countries,	 except	 for	 Austria	 and	 Germany,	 there	 is	 no	 border,	 where	 at	 least	 two	 TSOs	 offer	
capacity	at	an	IP.	Hence,	there	cannot	be	any	competition.	Although	Austria	has	a	few	IPs	connected	
with	adjacent	market	areas,	the	border	with	Slovakia	(IP	“Baumgarten”)	is	the	only	one,	where	both	




charge	 the	 same	 tariff	 at	 Baumgarten	 (E-Control,	 2019).	 Therefore,	 the	 potential	 inter-TSO	
competition	in	Austria	is	resolved	by	national	regulation;	GCA	and	TAG	cannot	compete	on	tariffs.	
Germany,	with	 its	 two	market	 areas	GASPOOL	and	Net	Connect	Germany	 (hereafter:	NCG)	 is	
currently	the	only	EU	Member	State,	where	at	least	two	TSOs	are	offering	capacities	at	least	at	some	
borders.	Unlike	Austria,	 in	Germany	 potential	 inter-TSO	 competition	 on	 tariffs	 is	 not	 restricted	 by	
national	 regulation.	 All	 TSOs	 in	 both	 German	market	 areas	 operate	 under	 a	 revenue-cap	 regime.	
Therefore,	we	may	only	assess	our	hypothesis	for	revenue-cap	regimes	using	panel	data	for	German	
gas	markets.	
As	 for	 data	 on	 IP	 tariffs,	we	make	use	 of	 a	 data	 set	 provided	by	ACER	 (2019a).	 This	 data	 set	
contains	the	cost	of	flowing	1	MWh	through	the	respective	IP	on	a	firm	basis	in	EUR/MWh	for	all	IPs	
across	Europe.13	As	German	TSOs	do	not	apply	commodity	charges,	i.e.	charges	for	the	gas	actually	
transported,	 such	 data	 refer	 to	 the	 capacity	 tariffs.	 In	 case	 different	 types	 of	 firm	 capacity	 are	
offered,	the	tariff	refers	to	the	best	available	capacity	type.	The	time	period	covered	by	the	data	set	
is	2014	to	2018.	Besides	that,	data	of	the	IP’s	TSO,	the	border	of	connected	market	areas,	and	the	
flow	 direction	 are	 listed.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 empirical	 model	 the	 tariff	 data	 is	 grouped	 by	 borders	
distinguishing	 flow	directions	and	gas	qualities.	Hence	every	group	of	data	has	either	entry	or	exit	
																																								 																				








border	 necessary	 to	 estimate	 the	 model,	 but	 also	 the	 number	 of	 TSOs	 at	 a	 border	 with	 captive	
demand.	This	information	can	be	obtained	directly	from	the	TSOs’	websites.		





border.	 Counting	 the	 congestion	 attribute	 gives	 the	 number	 of	 congested	 IPs	 as	 foreseen	 by	 the	
empirical	model.	
To	control	for	changes	in	tariffs	based	on	changes	in	allowed	revenues,	data	on	TSOs’	allowed	
revenues	 for	 2014	 to	 2018	 are	 necessary.	 Even	 though	 TSOs	 operate	 under	 wide-ranging	
transparency	 obligations,	 allowed	 revenues	 are	 not	 published	 for	 the	 time	period	 to	 be	 analysed.	
The	 main	 driver	 of	 the	 allowed	 revenues	 is	 the	 so-called	 regulated	 asset	 base	 (hereafter:	 RAB).	
Therefore,	the	RAB	may	be	used	as	a	proxy	for	the	allowed	revenues.	However,	also	data	on	RAB	are	
not	 available	 for	 the	 past.	 TSOs’	 annual	 reports,	 however,	 show	 the	 value	 of	 fixed	 assets.	 Fixed	








for	 German	 TSOs	 starts	 in	 October	 2013.	 Capacity	 bookings	 are	 distinguished	 in	 firm	 and	
interruptible.	In	determining	tariffs,	interruptible	capacity	is	usually	given	a	discount	to	compensate	
for	 the	 risk	of	being	 interrupted.	 In	 return,	 this	means	 that	a	booking	of	one	unit	of	 firm	capacity	
contributes	more	to	obtaining	revenues	than	a	booking	of	one	unit	of	interruptible	capacity,	because	
of	 the	 discount.	 Also,	 within	 the	 group	 firm	 capacity	 bookings,	 there	 are	 differences.	 There	 are	
different	 types	of	 firm	capacities	 that	may	be	offered	at	a	particular	 IP.	These	different	 types	may	
receive	a	discount	due	to	quality	differences.	Furthermore,	a	so-called	multiplier	may	be	added	to	




unit	 of	 capacity	 booked	may	 be	 higher	 or	 lower,	 depending	 on	 discounts	 granted	 and	multipliers	
applied.	 Such	 information	 is	 not	 available,	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 analysing	 the	
estimates	of	the	empirical	model.	
As	tariffs	of	a	TSO	are	based	on	the	sum	of	all	forecasted	capacity	bookings,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	
consider	 IP	 bookings	 only.	 The	 ENTSOG	 transparency	 platform	 also	 shows	 capacity	 at	 domestic	
points.	In	detail,	the	platform	contains	for	every	TSO	all	capacity	bookings	levels,	except	for	capacity	
towards	 downstream	 distribution	 system	 operators	 for	 supplying	 households.	 However,	 we	 may	






Therefore,	 a	 decision	 has	 to	 be	 made	 on	 how	 to	 forecast	 these	 values.	 We	 suppose	 the	 best	
forecasted	values	to	be	the	latest	actual	values.	Therefore,	the	forecast	for	data	in	t	shall	be	data	of	
t-1,	i.e.	lag	1	data.	This	means	that 𝑑𝐶𝑜!,!! = 𝑑𝐶𝑜!,!!!, 𝐶𝐵!,!,!! = 𝐶𝐵!,!,!!!,	and	 𝑅𝐴𝐵!,!,!! = 𝑅𝐴𝐵!,!,!!!.	
For	 consistency	 reasons,	 averages	 are	 calculated	 for	 the	 number	 of	 TSOs	 in	 t-1	 as	 well.	 In	 the	
remainder	we	drop	 time	 indices,	 and	 indicate	 lags	by	 supplement	 (-1).	As	 a	 consequence	of	using	
lagged	variables,	the	time	period	of	the	analysis	covers	2015	to	2018.	Introducing	lagged	dependent	
variables	avoids	the	endogeneity	bias	due	to	reverse	causation.	
Exploring	 the	 compiled	 data	 set	 reveals	 another	 market	 merger	 involving	 Belgium	 and	
Luxembourg	has	taken	place	during	the	period	of	observation.	In	order	to	keep	a	balanced	panel,	we	
treat	this	merger	as	the	gas	market	area	of	Luxembourg	had	not	existed	before	the	merger,	and	is	
directly	 integrated	 in	 the	 Belgian	 one.	 This	 means,	 we	 omit	 the	 observations	 for	 the	 one	 IP	
connecting	Luxembourg	and	NCG	until	the	merger,	and	consider	this	IP	as	another	substitute	to	the	
other	 IPs	 connecting	NCG	and	Belgium	afterwards.	 After	 this	 change,	 the	data	 set	 shows	 strongly	
balanced	panels	with	borders	𝑖 = 1,… ,35	and	𝑡 = 2015,… ,2018,	i.e.	four	observations	for	35	cross-
sections.		
Figure	2	plots	the	sum	of	the	book	value	of	the	fixed	assets,	and	capacity	bookings	for	firm	and	





demand,	 and	 the	number	of	 congested	 IPs.	 For	 the	number	of	 TSOs	being	 active	 at	 border,	most	
observations	 show	 only	 one	 TSO	 offering	 capacity	 at	 border	 (43.64%).	 However,	 also	 two	 TSOs	
(31.52%)	 and	 three	 TSOs	 (21.21%)	 appear	 relatively	 often.	 For	 the	 number	 of	 TSO	 with	 captive	
demand,	the	distribution	is	slightly	different.	87.27%	of	the	observations	show	either	one	TSO	with	
captive	demand	(47.88%)	or	two	(39.39%).	Three	TSOs	with	captive	demand	are	observed	in	9.70%	




(Table	 2)	 shows	 that	 in	 case	 only	 one	 TSO	 offers	 capacity	 at	 a	 border,	 there	 are	 only	 two	
observations	 with	 a	 TSO	 having	 no	 captive	 demand.	 Additionally,	 there	 are	 no	 observations	 with	
more	 than	one	TSO,	whereby	at	 least	one	TSO	has	 captive	demand.	 For	 the	empirical	model,	 this	
implies	that	𝑑𝐶𝐷 = 1	if	𝑑𝑆 = 1.	However,	if	𝑑𝑆 = 0,	𝑑𝐷𝐶 = 0	only	in	two	cases.	Based	on	only	two	
observations,	no	reliable	estimates	for	𝑑𝐶𝐷	can	be	expected.	Therefore,	we	drop	the	variable	from	







Number	 TSOs	(total)	 TSOs	(captive	demand)	 Congested	IPs	
	 Frequency	 Percent	 Frequency	 Percent	 Frequency	 Percent	
0	 0	 0	 2	 1.21	 134	 81.21	
1	 72	 43.64	 79	 47.88	 18	 10.91	
2	 52	 31.52	 65	 39.39	 10	 6.06	
3	 35	 21.21	 16	 9.70	 3	 2.82	
4	 6	 3.64	 3	 1.82	 0	 0	




number	TSOs	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Total	
1	 2	 70	 0	 0	 0	 72	
2	 0	 6	 46	 0	 0	 52	
3	 0	 0	 19	 16	 0	 35	
4	 0	 3	 0	 0	 3	 6	
Total	 2	 79	 65	 16	 3	 165	
To	 check	 the	 data	 set	 for	 stationarity,	 unit	 root	 test	may	be	 applied.	However,	 the	 power	 of	
these	 tests	 is	 low	due	 to	 the	 sample	 size.	Results	of	 testing	 for	 cointegration	are	also	not	 reliable	






made	 in	Section	4.2,	 for	minimum,	maximum,	and	median	tariffs	at	borders	by	 fixed	effects.	𝑑𝑆	 is	
the	 dummy	 variable	 denoting	 the	 difference	 between	 borders	 where	 more	 than	 on	 TSO	 offers	
capacity	(𝑑𝑆 = 1)	and	where	capacity	is	offered	only	by	one	TSO	(𝑑𝑆 = 0).	𝑑𝐶𝑂(−1),	being	a	lagged	
22	
variable,	 points	 out	 the	 difference	 between	 congested	 and	 non-congested	 borders	𝑙𝑛  !"#! (!!)!!!!!(!!) 	is	the	average	RAB	per	TSO	active	at	a	border	whilst	𝑙𝑛  !"! (!!)!!!!!(!!) 	stands	for	
the	average	total	capacity	bookings	per	TSO	active	at	a	border;	both	use	lag	(1)	data	as	a	forecast	in	
line	with	model	as	set	out	in	Section	4.2.	
In	 case	 more	 than	 one	 TSO	 is	 offering	 capacities	 at	 a	 border,	 network	 users	 have	 a	 choice	











The	estimated	marginal	 effect	of	 the	 forecasted	average	 capacity	bookings	 is	 -0.17%,	 -0.15%,	
and	-0.23%	(minimum,	maximum,	median	tariffs),	with	p	<	1%	for	both	maximum	and	median	tariffs,	
and	being	insignificant	in	case	of	minimum	tariffs.	







the	 forecasted	average	allowed	 revenues,	 as	 expected.	 Furthermore,	 estimates	 for	 the	 forecasted	
average	 capacity	 bookings	 are	 negative,	 as	 expected.	 Hence,	 we	 could	 verify	 the	 revenue	 cap	
constraint.	However,	both	estimates	related	to	minimum	tariffs	appear	to	be	 insignificant.	 It	could	
be	argued	that	taking	recent	actual	data	are	not	the	best	forecast.	Nevertheless,	 it	seems	to	be	an	




cap	 constraint	 is	 binding,	 seems	 to	 be	 not	 data	 related,	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 related	 to	 the	 TSOs’	
behaviour.	Insignificant	marginal	effects	indicate	that	TSOs	do	not	increase	or	decrease	tariffs	at	IPs	
in	relation	to	changes	in	allowed	revenues	or	capacity	bookings.	This	is	an	indication	that	TSOs	may	
set	 the	 tariffs	 in	 response	 to	 each	 other.	 Such	 behaviour	 observed	 for	 the	 minimum	 tariffs	 was	
expected	 for	 TSOs	 operating	 under	 e.g.	 a	 price-cap	 regime.	 However,	 the	 TSOs,	whose	 tariffs	 are	
analysed,	operate	under	a	revenue-cap	regime,	under	which	such	behaviour	was	not	expected.	
As	 for	congestions,	 the	results	suggest	TSOs	do	not	consider	congestion	 in	setting	 tariffs.	This	
raises	the	question	how	TSOs	deal	with	expected	scarcity.	In	practice,	capacity	allocation	takes	place	








theoretical	 assessment	 expects	 (in	 the	 short	 term)	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 tariffs	 between	





to	our	 theoretical	 analysis,	 such	behaviour	was	not	expected	 since	German	TSOs	operate	under	 a	
revenue-cap	 regime.	 Based	 on	 this,	 however,	 we	 cannot	 unambiguously	 accept	 or	 reject	 the	
existence	of	tariff	competition	between	regulated	TSOs	in	in	Germany.	
Table	 3:	 Estimates	 for	 the	 period	 2015-2018:	 Dependent	 variables	 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒊𝒏),	 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒂𝒙),	 and	 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏)	 (robust	
standard	errors	in	parentheses,	cross-section	fixed	effects	are	not	reported).	
 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#) 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#) 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#$%&) 𝑑𝑆 -0.5161***	 -0.0783***	 -0.2854***	
 (0.0605)	 (0.0196)	 (0.0199)	
	 	 	 	𝑑𝐶𝑂(−1) -0.0887	 0.0028	 0.0030	
 (0.0767)	 (0.0398)	 (0.0440)	
 	 	 	𝑙𝑛  𝑅𝐴𝐵! (−1)!!!!𝑚(−1)  -0.0176	(0.3250)	 0.2319**	(0.0883)	 0.3753***	(0.0844)	
 	 	 	𝑙𝑛  𝐶𝐵! (−1)!!!!𝑚(−1)  -0.1702	(0.1742)	 -0.1523***	(0.0465)	 -0.2298***	(0.0484)	
	 	 	 	Constant 4.0201	 -1.5079	 -2.3320	
 (3.5598)	 (1.7745)	 (1.5744)	
 	 	 	
Period fixed effects 	 	 	2016 -0.0866	 -0.0373*	 -0.0412*	
 (0.0624)	 (0.0196)	 (0.0217)	
 	 	 	2017 -0.0791	 -0.0179	 -0.0328	
 (0.0772)	 (0.0241)	 (0.0251)	
 	 	 	2018 -0.0164	 0.0464	 0.0143	
 (0.0592)	 (0.0352)	 (0.0322)	observations14 131	 131	 131	
Two-tailed	p-values:	*p	<	0.10,	**	p	<	0.05,	***	p	<	0.01		
																																								 																				















in	 Appendix	 A).	 It	 appears	 that	minimum	 tariffs	 are	 particularly	 charged	 by	 transit	 TSOs,	whereas	
maximum	 tariffs	 are	 particularly	 charged	 by	 meshed	 TSOs.	 This	 hints	 at	 structural	 differences	
between	transit	and	meshed	TSOs.		
In	 order	 to	 verify	 the	 existence	 of	 structural	 differences	 between	 transit	 and	 meshed	 TSOs	
impacting	the	tariffs,	the	empirical	model	is	applied	to	two	different	subsets	containing	only	transit	
(subset	 1)	 or	 only	meshed	 TSOs	 (subset	 2).	 If	 there	was	 a	 structural	 difference	 between	 the	 two	
groups	of	TSOs,	we	would	not	expect	a	large	and	statistically	significant	effect	of	having	more	than	
one	 TSO	 operating	 at	 a	 border	 on	 the	 tariffs	 for	 each	 of	 the	 subsets.	 The	 resulting	 estimates	 are	
compared	with	the	estimates	using	the	full	sample	as	Table	3.16	This	comparison	points	at	no	general	
differences	in	the	subsets	as	compared	to	the	full	sample.	As	for	subset	1,	there	are	no	observations.	
Regarding	 subset	2,	 for	example,	minimum	tariffs	also	appear	 to	be	more	 than	50%	 lower	 in	 case	
more	than	one	TSO	offers	capacity	at	a	border.	These	results	obtained	for	this	subset	are	similar	to	
the	estimates	obtained	using	the	full	sample.	
We	 find	 that	 transit	 TSOs	 in	 a	 vast	majority	 of	 cases	 charge	 the	minimum	 tariffs,	 and	 at	 the	
same	time	we	 find	a	 large	and	statistically	 significant	effect	of	having	more	 than	one	TSO	offering	
capacity	 at	 a	 border	 on	 tariffs	 within	 the	 group	 of	 meshed	 TSOs.	 Based	 on	 these	 findings,	 we	
conclude	 that	 differences	 between	 transit	 and	 meshed	 TSOs	 do	 not	 sufficiently	 explain	 the	
differences	in	tariffs	between	TSOs	facing	substitute	TSOs	and	TSOs	who	do	not.		
Analysing	 the	 subsets	 assumes	 homogeneous	 TSOs	 within	 each	 group.	 However,	 it	 may	 be	
argued	 even	 the	 group	 of	 meshed	 TSOs	 is	 rather	 heterogeneous.	 The	 meshed	 TSOs	 directly	 or	
indirectly,	via	a	connection	to	distribution	networks,	transport	gas	to	end	customers.	Nevertheless,	
some,	 but	 not	 all,	 meshed	 TSO	 also	 can	 be	 used	 for	 transit	 gas	 in	 case	 they	 are	 connected	 to	
different	gas	markets.	Also,	the	number	of	markets	a	TSO	is	connected	to	varies.	So,	it	appears	the	
group	of	meshed	TSOs	seems	rather	heterogeneous.	
Not	 only	 the	 TSOs'	 networks	 are	 different,	 but	 also	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 have	 been	
impacted	by	a	market	merger.	When	markets	are	merged,	less	capacity	is	subject	to	bookings	(Keller	
et	al.,	2019).	The	 loss	of	revenues	 is	redistributed	to	the	remaining	capacity	to	be	booked.	As	only	
the	 level	 of	 (forecasted)	 booked	 capacities	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 tariffs,	 tariffs,	 ceteris	 paribus,	







Market	mergers	may	also	 impact	 the	quality	of	 capacity	products	offered.	When	gas	markets	
are	merged,	TSOs,	for	example,	have	to	cope	with	new	possible	flow	scenarios.	Such	flows	may	not,	
or	may	only	be	possible	under	certain	conditions.	Such	conditions,	 for	 instances,	may	be	 linked	 to	
temperature,	demand	scenarios,	or	specific	routes	(ACER,	2019c).	The	restrictions	on	capacity	types	
induced	by	market	mergers	differ	per	TSO,	depending	on	the	individual	network,	and	at	what	actual	
borders	 a	merger	 has	 taken	 place,	 i.e.	 to	what	 extent	 the	 respective	 TSO	 has	 been	 affected	 by	 a	
merger.	 Keller	 et	 al.	 (2019)	 found,	 that	 not	 only	 the	 network	 tariffs	 matter	 to	 network	 users	 in	
making	a	booking	decision	between	alternatives,	but	also	the	quality,	i.e.	the	capacity	type,	matters.	
In	Germany,	 around	48%	of	 capacity	 offered	 at	 IP	 is	 conditional	 capacities	 (Grant	 Thornton	et	 al.,	













focus	 differs	 from	other	 studies	 and	 research,	which	 do	 not	 take	 account	 of	market	mergers	 and	
their	 impact	on	 the	potential	 for	 inter-TSO	competition	 (For	example,	 see	Cervigni	et	al.,	2019;	EY	
and	REKK	2018;	Hecking,	2015).	
The	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 this	 paper	 shows	 that	 TSOs	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 engage	 in	 tariff	
competition	 depending	 on	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 applied.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 under	 regimes	
imposing	a	volume	risk	to	TSOs,	such	as	a	price-cap	regime,	TSO	are	supposed	to	compete	on	tariffs.	
As	a	 consequence,	 they	are	 supposed	 to	 lower	 tariffs	 at	 competitive	 cross-border	 interconnection	
points,	and	 raise	 tariffs	 in	particular	 for	domestic	 customers,	who	cannot	 switch	 to	other	network	
points.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 TSOs	 in	 a	 merged	 market	 area	 operate	 under	 a	 regulatory	 regime	
without	any	volume	risk,	such	as	a	revenue-cap	regime,	there	are	no	 incentives	to	engage	 in	tariff	






not	provide	a	sufficient	explanation	for	 this	 result.	Hence,	 the	mechanism	by	which	the	regulatory	
regime	 affects	 tariff	 setting	 may	 be	 different	 (more	 complex)	 than	 we	 have	 assumed.	 Specific	
elements	 of	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 applied	 may	 explain	 why	 in	 case	 more	 than	 one	 TSO	 offers	
capacity	at	a	border,	 tariffs	are	 lower,	even	 if	 these	TSO	operate	under	a	revenue-cap	regime.	For	
26	
example,	a	TSO	may	expect	a	lower	utilisation	of	its	infrastructure	in	the	future	if	its	tariffs	are	above	
those	 of	 other	 TSOs	 offering	 the	 same	 service	 to	 network	 users.	 The	 firm	 may	 then	 expect	 the	
regulatory	 authority	 to	 grant	 a	 lower	 compensation	 for	 the	 costs	 spend	 in	 the	 future,	 as	 a	 lower	
utilisation	 indicates	 the	 infrastructure	 is	 less	 needed.	 This	would	 cause	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 allowed	
revenues	and,	 ceteris	paribus,	 in	profits.	 Even	 if	 a	 lower	utilisation	may	not	directly	 lead	 to	 lower	
allowed	 revenues,	 it	may	 indirectly	do	so.	TSOs	are	usually	exposed	 to	efficiency	benchmarking.	 If	
there	 is	 a	 structural	decrease	 in	utilisation,	 ceteris	paribus,	 the	 firm’s	efficiency	decreases	as	well,	




a	 number	 of	 TSOs	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 TSOs	 do	 not	 face	 a	 direct	 volume	 risk	 in	 the	 tariff	
regulation.	 Further	 research	 is	 required	 to	 determine	 how	 the	 regulatory	 process	 precisely	
influences	 the	 optimal	 tariff	 setting	 of	 the	 TSOs	 subject	 to	 revenue-cap	 regulation	 operating	 in	
merged	market	 areas.	 Hence,	 it	 cannot	 unambiguously	 be	 answered,	whether	 effective	 inter-TSO	
competition	on	tariffs	exists	in	Germany.	
Given	our	results,	regulatory	authorities	may	consider	applying	a	dual-till	approach	to	regulate	
TSOs	 in	 merged	 markets,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 allowing	 competition	 where	 possible.17	 Applied	 to	 gas	
markets,	 competition	 may	 be	 possible	 at	 cross-border	 interconnection	 points,	 however,	 captive	
demand	needs	 to	be	protected	 from	suffering	 from	 the	 regulatory	 change.	Hence,	 such	a	dual-till	
approach	 would	 consist	 of	 cross-border	 points	 being	 exposed	 to	 a	 price-cap	 regulation,	 while	 all	
other	network	points	are	exposed	to	a	revenue-cap	regulation.	In	addition,	and	to	enhance	the	inter-
TSO	 competition	 introduced	 by	 such	 a	 dual-till	 approach,	 more	 flexibility	 should	 be	 given	 to	 the	
regulated	 TSOs	 in	 setting	 competitive	 tariffs,	 for	 example,	 dynamic	 tariff	 adjustments	 instead	 of	
fixing	 tariffs	 for	 a	 tariff	 period.	 Being	 exposed	 to	 such	 a	 regulatory	 regime,	 TSOs	 may	 claim	 an	




17	 In	regulating	 (private)	airports,	a	distinction	 is	made	between	aeronautical	and	non-aeronautical	services.	Under	a	so-
called	 single-till	 regulation,	 both	 areas	 are	 combined	 in	 terms	 of	 revenue	 regulation.	 Alternatively,	 under	 a	 dual-till	





To	 explore	 potential	 structural	 differences	 between	 transit	 and	meshed	 TSOs,	we	 create	 a	 subset	
containing	all	borders,	at	which	at	least	one	transit	TSO	and	at	least	one	meshed	TSO	offers	capacity.	
This	subset	consists	of	41	observations.	Table	4	illustrates	how	often	the	minimum,	maximum,	and	
median	 tariff	 is	 charged	 by	 a	 transit	 or	 by	 a	 meshed	 TSO.	 It	 appears	 that	 minimum	 tariffs	 are	
particularly	 charged	by	 transit	TSOs,	whereas	maximum	tariffs	are	particularly	 charged	by	meshed	
TSOs.	
Table	4:	Distribution	of	𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒊𝒏),	𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒂𝒙),	and	𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏)	charged	by	transit	or	meshed	TSOs.	Cover	period	2015-















35	 6	 3	 38	 9	 18	 14	
85.37%	 14.63%	 7.32%	 92.68%	 21.95%	 43.90%	 34.15%	
To	 verify	 structural	 differences	 between	 transit	 and	 meshed	 TSOs,	 the	 empirical	 model	 is	
estimated	using	the	full	sample	and	the	two	subsets	as	defined	in	Table	5.	The	results	are	shown	in	












Table	 6:	 Estimates	 for	 different	 data	 sets	 for	 the	 period	 2015-2018:	 Dependent	 variables	 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒊𝒏),	 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒂𝒙),	 and	𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏)	(robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses,	cross-section	fixed	effects	are	not	reported).	
 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#)	 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#) 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇!"#$%&)	
 Full	sample	 Subset	2	 Full sample	 Subset	2	 Full sample Subset	2	𝑑𝑆 -0.5161***	 -0.5425***	 -0.0783***	 -0.0793**	 -0.2854***	 -0.2725***	
 (0.0605)	 (0.0218)	 (0.0196)	 (0.0315)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0263)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	𝑑𝐶𝑂(−1) -0.0887	 -0.1223**	 0.0028	 -0.0903***	 0.0030	 -0.1264***	
 (0.0767)	 (0.0503)	 (0.0398)	 (0.0243)	 (0.0440)	 (0.0281)	
 	 	 	 	 	 	𝑙𝑛  𝑅𝐴𝐵! (−1)!!!!𝑚(−1)  -0.0176	(0.3250)	 0.4282***	(0.1030)	 0.2319**	(0.0883)	 0.2780***	(0.0786)	 0.3753***	(0.0844)	 0.3648***	(0.0803)	
 	 	 	 	 	 	𝑙𝑛  𝐶𝐵! (−1)!!!!𝑚(−1)  -0.1702	(0.1742)	 -0.2510***	(0.0567)	 -0.1523***	(0.0465)	 -0.1774***	(0.0397)	 -0.2298***	(0.0484)	 -0.2249***	(0.0388)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	constant 4.0201	 -2.8622	 -1.5079	 -1.7757*	 -2.3320	 -2.2735	
 (3.5598)	 (2.4393)	 (1.7745)	 (0.9597)	 (1.5744)	 (1.3952)	
 	 	 	 	 	 	
Period fixed effects 	 	 	 	 	 	2016 -0.0866	 -0.0747**	 -0.0373*	 -0.0753***	 -0.0412*	 -0.0676**	
 (0.0624)	 (0.0343)	 (0.0196)	 (0.0228)	 (0.0217)	 (0.0239)	
 	 	 	 	 	 	2017 -0.0791	 -0.0777**	 -0.0179	 -0.0582**	 -0.0328	 -0.0729***	
 (0.0772)	 (0.0285)	 (0.0241)	 (0.0267)	 (0.0251)	 (0.0245)	
 	 	 	 	 	 	2018 -0.0164	 -0.0365	 0.0464	 0.0153	 0.0143	 -0.0173	
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